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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

FRANK GRANATO,
Plaintiff -Appell ant,
Case No. 14425
THE SALT LAKE COUNTY
GRAND JURY, e t a l . ,
Defendants -Respondents.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
On the 12th day of December, 1975, in the District Court of
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the appellant filed an amended complaint for a writ of habeas corpus against the respondents alleging the
illegality of his constructive restraint which followed an indictment
against him which was returned by the respondents on the 26th day of
August, 1975.
The appellant contends his constructive restraint is in viola
tion of due process and equal protection afforded him in the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution of the United States and
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Article I, Sections 7, 12, 24, and 27 of the Constitution of the State of
Utah, because:
1.
The indictment was issued without
probable cause,
2.
The appellant was denied verbatim
copies of transcripts of the testimony of all witnesses who appeared before the respondents
relative to the indictment.
3.
The appellant was denied the names,
addresses, and telephone numbers of all persons
interviewed relative to the indictment to determine both inculpatory and exculpatory evidence.
4.
The appellant was denied taking depo sitions before trial on the indictment.
5.
The appellant was denied a preliminary
examination before trial on the indictment.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
On the 15th day of December, 1975, the Honorable Elrnest F .
Baldwin, Jr., Judge of the District Court of Salt Lake County, State of
Utah, granted the respondents1 motion to dismiss the appellant's amended
complaint for failing to state a claim for which relief could be granted.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The appellant seeks a reversal of the lower court's dismissal
of the appellant's amended complaint and a writ of habeas corpus ordering the appellant released from constructive restraint relative to the
indictment.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

In the alternative the appellant seeks this court to:
1.
Remand this matter to the lower
court to have a hearing on the merits relative
to the sufficiency of probable cause relative
to the indictment.
2.
Order that the appellant be furnished
verbatim copies of transcripts of the testimony
of all witnesses who appeared before the respondents relative to the indictment.
3.
Order that the appellant be furnished
the names, addresses, and telephone numbers
of all persons interviewed relative to the indictment to determine both inculpatory and exculpatory evidence.
4.
Order that the appellant be permitted
to take depositions before trial on the indictment.
5.
Order that the appellant be given a
preliminary examination before trial on the
indictment.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
(Relating to Indictment)
On the 26th day of August, 1975, in the District Court of
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, respondents filed a four-count felony
indictment, Criminal No. 28220, against the appellant in his official
executive capacity of being Chairman of the Salt Lake County Planning
and Zoning Commission.
Count I alleges that on or about the 23rd day of May, 1973,
the appellant asked for a bribe from George Jones . . . .
Count II alleges that on or about the 23rd day of May, 1973,
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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the appellant received a bribe from George Jones . . . .
Count III alleges that on or about the 8th day of August,
1973, the appellant solicited a bribe from George Jones . . . .
Count IV alleges that on or about the 8th day of August,
1973, the appellant accepted a bribe from George Jones . . . .
Seeking to challenge the sufficiency of probable cause and to
adequately prepare in the event of trial for the indictment in Criminal
No. 28220 in the District Court of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the
appellant on the 20th day of November, 1976, filed motions requesting:
1.
Verbatim copies of transcripts of
testimony of all witnesses who appeared before
the grand jury relative to the indictment.
2.
The names, addresses, and telephone numbers of all persons interviewed by
the grand jury to determine both inculpatory
and exculpatory evidence.
3.
Depositions be taken by the appellant
of all persons deemed necessary for adequate
preparation of his defense to the indictment.
4•
A preliminary examination be
afforded the appellant before trial on the
indictment.
On the 25th day of November, 1975, the Honorable Ernest F .
Baldwin, Jr., Judge of the District Court of Salt Lake County, State of
Utah, heard arguments of the above motions filed by the appellant in
Criminal No. 28220 and ruled from the bench that:
1.

The appellant's motion to be
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furnished verbatim copies of transcripts of
all witnesses who appeared before the grand
jury relative to the indictment be granted.
2.
The appellant's motion requesting
the names, addresses, and telephone numbers
of all persons interviewed by the grand jury to
determine both inculpatory and exculpatory
evidence was granted in part and denied in part.
Judge Baldwin granted that the appellant be
furnished the names, addresses, and telephone
numbers of all witnesses whom the State would
call at trial on the indictment. Judge Baldwin
denied that the appellant be furnished the
names, addresses, and telephone numbers of
any persons interviewed by the grand jury to
determine both inculpatory and exculpatory
evidence whom the State would not call at trial
on the indictment.
3.
The appellant's motion to take
depositions of all persons deemed necessary
for adequate preparation of his defense to the
indictment be denied.
4.
The appellant's motion to be
afforded a preliminary examination before trial
on the indictment be denied.
On the 3rd day of December, 1975, Judge Baldwin amended
his order of November 25, 1975, which granted the appellant's motion
to be furnished verbatim copies of transcripts of all witnesses who
appeared before the grand jury relative to the indictment. His amended
order of December 3, 1975, denied the appellant verbatim copies of
transcripts of testimony of any witnesses who appeared before the
grand jury relative to the indictment. It granted the appellant reading
inspection only of transcripts of testimony of the three witnesses named
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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on the indictment who appeared before the grand jury. And it denied
the appellant to take any verbatim notes from his reading inspection of
the transcripts of testimony of the three witnesses named on the indictment who appeared before the grand jury.
All three witnesses named on the indictment were documented
accomplices, granted immunity, and are without corroboration to establish probable cause for the indictment.
On or about the 15th day of December, 1975, the Honorable
Ernest F . Baldwin, Jr., Judge of the District Court of Salt Lake County,
State of Utah, ordered that the trial on the indictment, Criminal No.
28220, against the appellant be stayed until this appeal is decided.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
(Relating to Habeas Corpus)
Subsequent to the orders made on the 25th day of November,
1975, relative to the indictment, Criminal No. 28220, by the Honorable
Ernest F . Baldwin, Jr., Judge of the District Court of Salt Lake County,
State of Utah, the appellant filed in the same court on the same day a
civil complaint for a writ of habeas corpus, Civil No. 231867, alleging
the illegality of his constructive restraint in Criminal No. 28220 because
there was insufficient probable cause for the indictment.
On the 12th day of December, 1975, the appellant filed an
amended complaint in Civil No. 231867 alleging the illegality of his
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constructive restraint in violation of the due process and equal protection provisions of the Constitution of the State of Utah and the Constitution of the United States because:
1.
The indictment in Criminal No.
28220 against the appellant was issued without
sufficient probable cause.
2.
The appellant was denied verbatim
copies of transcripts of testimony of any and
all witnesses who appeared before the grand
jury relative to the indictment.
3.
The appellant was denied the
names, addresses, and telephone numbers of
all persons interviewed by the grand jury to
determine both inculpatory and exculpatory
evidence.
4.
The appellant was denied taking
depositions of all persons deemed necessary
for adequate preparation of his defense to the
indictment.
5.
The appellant was denied a
preliminary examination before trial on the
indictment.
On the 15th day of December, 1975, the Honorable Ernest F .
Baldwin, Jr., Judge of the District Court of Salt Lake County, State of
Utah, granted the respondent's motion to dismiss the appellant's complaint and amended complaint in Civil No. 231867 and on the 26th day of
January, 1976, ordered in writing that both the appellant's complaint and
amended complaint be dismissed for their failure to state a claim for
which relief could be granted.
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That written order of the lower court is the subject of this
appeal to this court.
ARGUMENT
Point I
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING
APPELLANT'S COMPLAINT FOR FAILURE
TO STATE A CLAIM FOR WHICH RELIEF
COULD BE GRANTED.
Habeas corpus is civil in nature*- and provided for by the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.^
Rule 65B(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
Special forms of pleadings and of
writs in habeas corpus . . . a r e
hereby abolished. Where no other
plain, speedy and adequate remedy
exists, relief may be obtained by
appropriate action under these rules,
on any one of the grounds set forth
in subdivision (b) and (f) of this r u l e .
(Emphasis added.)
Rule 65B(f), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
Habeas Corpus. Appropriate relief
by habeas corpus proceedings shall
be granted whenever it appears to
the proper court that any person is
unjustly imprisoned or otherwise
restrained of his liberty. If the

1

• Home v. Turner, 29 Utah 2d 175, 506 P.2d 1268.
2 . Rule 65B (f), Utah R. Civ. P . ; Burleigh v. Turner, 15 Utah 2d 118,
388 P.2d 412.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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person seeking relief is imprisoned
in the penitentiary and asserts that
in the proceedings which resulted in
his conviction there was a substantial
denial of his rights under the Constitution of the United States or under
the Constitution of the State of Utah,
or both, then the person seeking such
relief shall proceed in accordance
with Rule 65 B (i). In all other cases,
proceedings under this subdivision
shall be conducted in accordance with
the following provisions:
(1) The complaint seeking
relief shall, among other things, state
that the person designated is illegally
restrained of his liberty by the defendant . . . the cause or pretense (of
the restraint) . . . annexing a copy of
any legal process . . . that the
legality of the . . . restraint has not
already been adjudged upon a prior
proceeding; whether another complaint
for the same relief has been filed and
relief thereunder has been denied by
any court . . . . (Emphasis added.)
Rule 65B (f)(1), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, as cited
above, is consistent with the requirements of Form 17, Complaint
Seeking Writ of Habeas Coipus, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, which
was followed substantially in the preparation of appellant's complaint
and amended complaint which were dismissed by the lower court for
failure to state a claim for which relief could be granted.
Rule 8(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
A pleading which sets forth a claim for
relief . . . shall contain (1) a short and
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
_o_

plain statement of the claim showing
that the pleader is entitled to relief;
and (2) a demand for judgment for the
relief to which he deems himself
entitled. Relief in the alternative or
of several different types may be
demanded.
The appellant's complaint and amended complaint which were
dismissed by the lower court for failure to state a claim for which
relief could be granted also met the requirements of Rule 8(a), Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure, as cited above.
Rule 8(e) (1), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
Each averment of a pleading shall be
simple, concise, and direct. No
technical forms of pleading or motions
are required.
The appellant's complaint and amended complaint which the
lower court dismissed for failure to state a claim for which relief could
be granted also met the requirements of Rule 8(e) (1), Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure, as cited above.
Rule 8 (e) (2), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
A party may also state as many claims
. . . as he has regardless of consistency
and whether based on legal or equitable
grounds or on both.
The appellant's complaint and amended complaint also met the
requirements of Rule 8(e) (2), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, as cited
above.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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In fact, the appellant challenges the respondents to cite any
requirement within the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure which the appel lantTs complaint and amended complaint did not meet, although they
were dismissed by the lower court for failure to state a claim for which
relief could be granted.
Even though it is in the nature of a writ of error, habeas
corpus is not to be used simply for appellate review of e r r o r . 3 Instead,
habeas corpus is a collateral^ challenge of jurisdiction. ^
Habeas corpus was brought in the instant case to challenge
jurisdiction. Both the respondents and the lower court recognized this
purpose, and neither made issue to the contrary in pleadings nor hearings. Therefore, this court should not concern itself with the propriety
of the nature of relief sought, because this case should be reviewed as
presented and decided by the trial court."
The only issue to be decided by this court relative to this
numbered point is whether the trial court procedurally properly dismissed the appellant's complaint and amended complaint for failing to

3. Bryant v. Turner, 19 Utah 2d 284, 431 P.2d 121.
4. Goto v. Lane, 265 U.S. 393, 68 L . Ed. 1070, 44 S. Ct. 525.
5. Bryant v. Turner, 19 Utah 2d 284, 431 P.2d 121; § 2225, 5 Whartonfs
Criminal Law and Procedure 455-458, and the many cases cited
thereunder.
6. Robert A. Crist and Jack L. Williams, dba Oak Hill School v.
Mapelton City and Paul Cherrington, Utah 1972, 497 P.2d 633.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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state a claim for which relief could be granted.
Rule 12(b)(6), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides that
the respondents were within their rights to file a motion to dismiss for
failure to state a claim for which relief could be granted. However,
Rule 12(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure further provides that such
motion should be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of
as provided in Rule 56, and all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to present all material made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56.
Rule 56(c), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides that there
can be no summary judgment rendered unless there is no genuine issue
as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as
a matter of law.
There exists in the instant case a genuine issue as to a
material fact, i . e . , whether there was probable cause for the respondents to return the indictment. The only manner in which the lower
court could have determined probable cause would have been to have had
an adversary hearing wherein both court and counsel could have reviewed
and been heard on the contents of the transcripts of the witnesses named
in the indictment as those on whose testimony the indictment was
returned.
The lower court did not review the transcripts of the grand
jury witnesses (T. 11) • The lower court denied the appellant's motion
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for verbatim transcripts of the grand jury witnesses. And the lower
court refused to rule on the issue of probable cause, which was the
genuine issue present concerning a very material fact which should have
prevented the respondents from being entitled to a judgment as a matter
of law.
The respondents were not entitled to a judgment of dismissal
as a matter of law because habeas corpus is the proper procedure to
follow in challenging the trial court's jurisdiction for lack of probable
cause for the return of an indictment. ^
The respondents argued:
I don't believe statutorily that this
Court or any Court should review the
indictment of the Grand Jury to determine whether or not the Grand Jury
rightfully or properly had probable
cause to issue the indictment (Tr. 3).
Yet, Utah Code Annotated § 77-19-3 (Supp. 1975) states that
the grand jury must receive none but legal evidence, and the best evidence in degree, to the exclusion of hearsay or secondary evidence.
How can the propriety of the grand jury indictment be determined if
there can be no judicial review? And how can there be a proper judicial
review if the appellant be denied the due process of law right to notice

7. Shelby v. Sixth Judicial District Court, 82 Nev. 204, 414 P.2d 942;
Ivey v. State, 82 Nev. 427, 420 P.2d 853; Franklin v. State,
Nev. 1973, 513 P.2d 1252.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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and be heard rather than summarily have his alleged genuine issue
ignored?
Furthermore, how can the appellant have equal protection of
the law when counsel for the respondents have verbatim transcripts of
grand jury testimony to determine probable cause, but he cannot?
The lower court lacks jurisdiction to proceed to criminal
trial with the appellant until probable cause has been determined by
judicial hearing to exist for the return of the indictment.
The lower court's order of dismissal for failure to state a
claim for which relief could be granted should be reversed. This
matter should be remanded to the lower court for an adversary hearing
to determine if probable cause existed to warrant the return of the
indictment.
Point II
APPELLANT WAS UNCONSTITUTIONALLY DENIED
VERBATIM COPIES OF TRANSCRIPTS OF ALL
GRAND JURY WITNESSES •
In addition to the need for transcripts of testimony of grand
jury witnesses to challenge probable cause for the return of the indictment, as discussed in more detail in Point I, there exist further needs
to meet the constitutional rights of the appellant.
For example, article I, section 12 of the Constitution of Utah
provides, inter alia, that in criminal prosecutions the accused shall
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
1 A contain
_
Machine-generated OCR, may
errors.

have the right to demand the nature and cause of the accusation against
him, to have a copy thereof, to be confronted by witnesses against him,
and to appeal.
It should be carefully noted that our constitution refers to
prosecutions, not just trials, when it states these and other rights of an
accused. And our constitution does not limit its terms to a complaint,
an information, nor an indictment when it states that an accused has the
right to demand the nature and cause of the accusation against him and
to have a copy thereof.
To assume propriety relative to the grand jurors and the
prosecutors, it must be further assumed that witnesses who testified
before the grand jury at the request of the prosecutors must have made
accusations against the appellant to cause the return of the indictment.
Therefore, the appellant has the right to have verbatim copies of the
transcripts of the testimony of all witnesses who appeared before the
grand jury if he indeed is to be afforded his constitutional right to have
a copy of the nature and cause of the accusation against him 0
Also, the same reasoning would compel that the appellant
has the right to have verbatim copies of the transcripts of the testimony of all witnesses who appeared before the grand jury if he indeed
is to be afforded his constitutional right to be confronted by the witnesses against him.
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Furthermore, the same reasoning would compel that the
appellant has the right to have verbatim copies of the transcripts of the
testimony of all witnesses who appeared before the grand jury if he
indeed is to be afforded his constitutional right to appeal. Without verbatim copies of the transcripts of the testimony of all witnesses who
appeared before the grand jury, how could the appellant challenge or
appeal an adverse ruling concerning the requirements of Utah Code
Annotated § 77-19-3 (Supp. 1975) which provide that the grand jury must
receive none but legal evidence, and the best evidence in degree, to the
exclusion of hearsay or secondary evidence?
This court in the case of State v. Harries" held that the
accused was entitled to inspect at trial for the purpose of impeachment
the transcript of testimony of witnesses before the grand jury*
And this court in the case of State v. Faux^ held that (1) the
accused was entitled to inspect before trial for the purpose of impeachment the transcript of testimony of witnesses before the grand jury;
(2) the accused has the right to be confronted with the witnesses against
him; (3) the defense counsel is entitled to use the transcript a reasonable
time before trial so that he can properly prepare his defense and the
trial could proceed with efficiency and dispatch; and (4) equal justice

8. 118 Utah 260, 221 P.2d 605.
9. 9 Utah 2d 350, 345 P.2d 186.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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demands that no one's rights or reputation may be invaded or destroyed
by unidentified informers.
Courts in other jurisdictions have held for various reasons
that the accused has the right to have copies of the transcripts of the
testimony of the witnesses who appeared before the grand jury. 10
Notwithstanding that grand jury proceedings have been kept
secret for reasons this court stated in State v. Faux*-*-, this court
therein held that after the indictment is returned and the accused is
arrested, the reasons for secrecy have been largely spent; and it would
be unfair not to allow defense counsel to inspect the transcripts before
trial while one charged by the usual method of filing a complaint is
entitled to a preliminary hearing which affords him an opportunity to
know what the witnesses against him testify to; whereas one indicted by
a grand jury does not have that advantage.
This court should reverse the lower court's order of dismissal of the appellant's complaint and amended complaint and remand
this case with an order compelling the lower court to furnish the
10. Shelby v. Sixth Tudicial District Court, 82 Nev. 204, 414 P.2d 942;
Ivey v. State, 82 Nev. 427, 420 P.2d 853; Riley v. State, Nev.
1967, 429 P.2d 59; Franklin v. State, Nev. 1973, 513 P.2d 1252;
People v. Bellanca, 386 Mich. 708, 194 N.W. 863; Parpliano v.
District Court, Colo. 1971, 491 P.2d 965; Johnson v. Superior
Court of San Joaquin County, 124 Cal. Rptr. 32, 539 P.2d 792;
State v. Parks, Alaska 1968, 437 P.2d 642; Burkholder v. State,
Alaska 1971, 491 P.2d 754.
11. 9 Utah 2d 350, 345 P.2d 186.
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appellant verbatim copies of the transcripts of the testimony of all witnesses who appeared before the grand jury. Otherwise, the appellant
would be denied due process and equal protection afforded him by the
Constitution of the United States and the Constitution of the State of Utah.
Point III
THE LOWER COURT'S ORDER DENYING THE
APPELLANT A PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION
VIOLATES ARTICLE I, SECTION 13 OF THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF UTAH AND
DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION OF
THE CONSTITUTIONS OF THE UNITED STATES
AND THE STATE OF UTAH .
Article I, Section 13 of the Constitution of the State of Utah
provides:
Offenses heretofore required to be
prosecuted by indictment, shall be
prosecuted by information after
examination and commitment by a
magistrate, unless the examination
be waived by the accused with the
consent of the State, or by indictment,
with or without such examination and
commitment. (Emphasis added.)
This court has repeatedly held that an accused charged by
information has a right to have a preliminary examination before t r i a l . ^

12. State v. Leek, 85 Utah 531, 39 P.2d 1091; State v. Hale,
Utah
, 263 P. 86; State v. Jensen, 36 Utah 166, 96 P. 1085;
State v. Hoben, 36 Utah 186, 102 P. 1000; State v. Pay, 45 Utah
411, 146 P. 300; State v. Sheffield, 45 Utah 426, 146 P. 306;
State v. Nelson, 52 Utah 617, 176 P. 860.
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However, by dictuml3 and habit only, so far as can be ascertained by
the appellant, the courts of the State of Utah have held that an accused
charged by indictment does not have the right to have a preliminary
examination before trial.
Yet, the Constitution of the State of Utah*"* clearly expresses
Tf

. . , by indictment, with or without such examination . . . . "

(Emphasis added.)
We must look to our dictionaries and English books to find the
meaning of the material words of our constitution which provide for
preliminary examinations and indictments.
The word frsuchtf within the phrase "with or without such
examination" is used as an adjective modifying the noun "examination"
to describe what kind or which one, ^ specifically being the same as
what was stated before. 1° Therefore, the phrase "with or without such
examination" as used in our constitution-^ following the word "indictment" must be construed to mean the same kind of an examination as
stated before relative to informations. That is, every accused charged

13. State v. Faux, 9 Utah 2d 350, 345 P.2d 186.
14. Utah Const, art I, § 13.
15. Warriner's English Grammar and Composition, § 1 c, p . 8;
Harbrace Handbook of English, Revised Edition, § 4 a, p . 67.
16. Webster's New International Dictionary, Second Edition, Unabridged,
p. 2518; Webster's New World Dictionary of the American
Language, College Edition, p . 1456.
17. Utah Const, art. I, § 13.
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by information or indictment has the right to have a preliminary examination before trial unless the examination be waived by the accused with
the consent of the State. Otherwise, what would be the meaning of the
phrase following the word "indictment" which states "with or without
such examination"? There would surely be a denial of equal protection
if one accused charged by indictment had the right to have such examination (with), and another accused charged by indictment was denied the
right to have such examination (without).
And there would surely be a denial of equal protection if the
prosecutor were to be able to charge one accused by information, affording him with the right to such examination before trial; and to be able to
have charged another accused by indictment of the very same offense,
denying him the right to such examination before trial.
The Supreme Court of the United States has recently held that
a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
of the Constitution of the United States occurs when a state arbitrarily
grants or denies procedural protections to persons similarly situated.^
The Supreme Court of the State of Michigan, relying on its
inherent powers to regulate the criminal process, held that any accused,
whether he be charged by information or indictment, has the fundamental

18. Humphrey v. Cody, 405 U.S. 504 (1972); Jackson v. Indiana, 406
U.S. 715 (1972); Baxtram v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107 (1966).
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right to a preliminary examination before t r i a l . ^
The Supreme Court of the State of California has stated:
Until the accused is given the right to
demand a post indictment preliminary
hearing there is no question but that
he is being denied due process at a
critical stage of the proceedings, and
also that there is a violation of equal
protection when rights accorded an
indicted defendant are compared with
those of an individual whose prosecution is initiated by information .20
(Emphasis added.)
This court should overrule the lower court's order dismissing
the appellant's complaint and amended complaint and remand this matter
with an order compelling the lower court to afford the appellant his right
to have a preliminary examination before trial.
Point IV
THE LOWER COURT1 S ORDER DENYING THE
APPELLANT THE RIGHT TO TAKE DEPOSITIONS
AS REQUESTED VIOLATES DUE PROCESS AND
EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE CONSTITUTIONS
OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE STATE OF
UTAH.
This court has unanimously held in an opinion written by
Justice Crockett that it was error for an accused charged by indictment

19. People v. Duncan, 338 Mich. 489, 201 N.W.2d 629 (1972).
20. Johnson v. Superior Court of San Joaquin County, 124 Cal. Rptr. 32,
539 P.2d 792 (1973), concurring opinion, Justice Mosk, concurred
in by Chief Justice Wright, and not dissented to by Justice Tobriner,
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to be denied the right to take depositions before t r i a l . 2 1 However,
four qf the justices, including Justice Crockett, held such e r r o r not to
be prejudicial because the defendant did not claim that he would have
obtained any additional information from the depositions. Nor did he
argue their value for impeachment or cross-examination. The fifth
justice, Justice Henriod, dissenting, but only in that he believed it was
prejudicial to deny the accused the right or privilege either of taking
depositions of witnesses or having a preliminary hearing, stated:
The main opinion points out correctly
that the accused had access to information obtained by the Grand Jury, ^ a nd
was furnished answers by the district
attorney to interrogatories put to h i m .
But it loses sight of the fact that such
information was not the product of
sworn testimony elicited by questions
put by counsel of the accused's choice.
It seems to lose sight also, of the fact
that preliminary hearings and the right
to take depositions frequently are the
sharpest weapons available to counsel
in piercing subsequent testimony by
confrontation with prior inconsistent
testimony. Such an opportunity, denial
of which appellant assigned as e r r o r ,
quite frequently results in impeachment
that may make the difference between
guilt o r innocence in the minds of the
veniremen.
2 . State v. Faux, District Judges of the
Third District, 1959, 9 Utah 2d
350, 345 P.2d 186. (Emphasis
added.)
2 1 . State v . Geurtz, 11 Utah 2d 345, 359 P.2d 12.
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Surprisingly, without any reference to its unanimous opinion
to the contrary, as expressed in the Geurtz case, 22 t h i s court later and
most recently held in a 3-2 opinion written by Justice Tuckett that it was
not error for an accused charged by complaint to be denied the right to
take depositions before trial, except when a material witness for the
defendant is about to leave the state or is so ill or infirm as to afford
reasonable grounds for apprehension that he will be unable to attend the
trial. 2 3
Chief Justice Callister and Justice Henriod concurred in the
Nielsen case^ 4 without either writing a separate opinion. Therefore,
we are not given the benefit of their reasons for their apparently inconsistent respective opinions in the Geurtz25

anc j

Nielsen 2 ^ cases.

Justice Ellett and Justice Crockett dissented in the Nielsen
case27 with each writing a separate opinion. Justice Crockett is consistent in his opinions in the Geurtz2° and Nielsen 2 ^ cases, and Justice
Ellett has never rendered an opinion that is inconsistent with his opinion
in the Nielsen case.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

State v. Geurtz, 11 Utah 2d 345, 359 P.2d 12.
State v. Nielsen, Utah 1974, 522 P.2d 1366.
Id.
Supra, n. 22.
Supra, n. 23.
Supra, n. 23.
Supra, n. 22,
Supra, n. 23.
Supra, n. 23.
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Chief Justice Callister is no longer on the bench. He was
very recently replaced by now Justice Maughan, who was then counsel
for the defendant-appellant in the Nielsen case, 31 wherein he advocated
that the accused charged by complaint had the same right to take depositions in criminal cases as in civil cases.
It should reasonably be anticipated that this court as presently
constructed should overrule the Nielsen case.^2 And that is precisely
what the appellant here seeks. There is no need nor basis to distinguish
it. And there is no reason nor excuse to ignore it.
Four of the five justices of this present court (Chief Justice
Henriod, Justice Crockett, Justice Ellett, and Justice Maughan) have at
different times opined that an accused charged with a crime or malfeasance in office has the same right to take depositions in criminal cases
as in civil cases.
The time is long past due to correct this inequality of justice
that presently exists in this state between the right of a defendant in a
civil case to take depositions and the denial of a defendant in a criminal
case to take depositions for the same purposes. If the right to take
depositions is afforded a defendant in a civil case, where he stands to
lose only his dollars and cents, surely that same right should be afforded

31. State v. Nielsen, Utah 1974, 522 P.2d 1366.
32. Id.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

a defendant in a criminal case, where he stands to lose his life or
liberty.'
This issue should be resolved now in favor of the appellant's
right to take depositions before trial in his criminal case. And it should
be so resolved whether initiated by seeking a declaration, as was done
in the Nielsen case;*3 or by a habeas corpus complaint, as was done in
this case; or by any other form which in substance presents the same
issue. Also, it should be resolved whether an accused is charged with a
crime by complaint, information, or indictment; or whether an accused
is charged with malfeasance in office by a complaint, information, or
indictment.
As Chief Justice Henriod stated in his dissenting opinion in the
Geurtz case, ^ where he believed it was prejudicial error to deny the
accused the right or privilege either of taking depositions of witnesses or
of having a preliminary hearing:
Such queasy quasi reasoning seems
hardly befitting our historical and
traditional insistence that an accused
be possessed of reasonably adequate
defensive tools, including representation by counsel, so as properly to
present his side in the fairest possible
manner.
This court should overrule the Nielsen case^S for at least
33. State v. Nielsen, Utah 1974, 522 P.2d 1366.
34. State v. Geurtz, 11 Utah 2d 345, 359 P.2d 12.
35. Supra, n. 33.
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five reasons.
1.

It held that the taking of depositions in criminal cases

is governed by two statutes, 3 6 which apply only when a witness is about
to leave the state or is so ill or infirm as to afford reasonable grounds
for apprehension that he will be unable to attend the trial. However, it
failed to hold or even mention that the taking of depositions in criminal
cases is also governed by two other statutes, ^ as Justice Crockett noted
in his dissent, which apply only when a witness resides out of the state.
2.

The Nielsen c a s e ^ held that neither statutes nor rules

of civil procedure providing for discovery or the inspection of evidence
in the possession of an adverse party will be made applicable to criminal
cases, citing cases all of which were decided before Rule 81 (e), Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure was adopted by order of this court January 20,
1974, which states:
These rules of procedure shall also
govern in any aspect of criminal pro ceedings where there is no other
applicable statute or rule, provided,
that any rule so applied does not
conflict with any statutory or constitutional requirement.
For the reasons that both Justice Ellett and Justice Crockett
point out in their respective dissents in the Nielsen case, 39 there is no
36.
37.
38.
39.

Utah Code Ann. §§ 77-46-1, 2 (1953).
Utah Code Ann. §§ 77-47-1, 2 (1953).
State v. Nielsen, Utah 1974, 522 P.2d 1366.
W.
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conflict between Rule 81 (e), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and the
statutes 4 ^ cited by the majority.
3.

The Nielsen case 4 1 held that Rule 30(a), Utah Rules of

Civil Procedure, which provides that any party may take the testimony
of any person, including a party, by deposition upon oral examination,
is so broad in scope that its application to criminal cases would present
grave constitutional problems. For example, an attempt to take the
deposition of a defendant would violate his right against self-incrimination
and his right to remain silent.
Of course, quite simply, that reasoning is without merit,
because as Justice Crockett further points out in his same dissent,

M

No

one supposes that any procedural rule could deprive a person of his
constitutional rights; and Rule 81(e) clearly so indicates/' It is fundamental that even during a deposition in a civil case, a witness has the
right against self-incrimination and the right to remain silent on that
constitutional ground.
4.

The Nielsen case 4 ^ held that until the statutes cited 4 ^

are modified or repealed by the legislature, this court would be without
power to provide for discovery proceedings by court rule.

40.
41.
42.
43.

Utah Code Ann. §§ 77-46-1, 2 (1953).
State v. Nielsen, Utah 1974, 522 P.2d 1366.
W.
Supra, n. 40.
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This reasoning is also without merit, because it fails to
recognize the statutory authority 44 and the inherent power 45 this court
has to make, modify, or repeal rules of procedure, such as Rule 25 of
the Uniform Rules of Criminal Procedure prepared by the National
Commissioners on Uniform Laws — and hopefully a similar rule to be
proposed by this court's present Advisory Committee on the Rules of
Criminal Procedure — providing for depositions in criminal cases the
same as in civil cases.
If this court is presently without statutory authority or inherent
power to make, modify, or repeal rules of judicial procedure — and
must therein submit to legislative control — then there exists a very
serious violation of constitutional separation of powers, and surely no
purpose to justify the existence of this very court's present Advisory
Committee on the Rules of Criminal Procedure.
5.

If the statutes cited 4 " are as restrictive as the majority

held them to be in the Nielsen c a s e , 4 7 and this court is without statutory
authority or inherent power and therefore fails to provide for depositions
in criminal cases the same as in civil cases, then an accused charged
with a crime or malfeasance in office will be denied due process and

44. Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-4 (1953).
45. People v. Duncan, 338 Mich. 489, 201 N.W. 2d 629 (1972); Ex parte
Welborn, 237 Mo. 297, 141 S.W. 31 (1911).
46. Utah Code Ann. §§ 77-46-1, 2 (1953).
47. State v. Nielsen, Utah 1974, 522 P.2d 1366.
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equal protection of the law in violation of the Constitution of the United
States and the Constitution of the State of Utah.
This court should reverse the lower court's order of dismissal of the appellant's complaint and amended complaint and remand
this matter to the lower court with the order that the appellant be
granted the right to take depositions as requested before his criminal
trial so that he may use such depositions for discovery, cross-examination, impeachment, confrontation, or any other purpose afforded a party
in a civil case.
CONCLUSION
Due process and equal protection of the law are synonymous
with the fundamental principle of what is fair for one is fair for all who
are similarly situated.
One charged with a crime or malfeasance in office, be he
charged by complaint, information, or indictment, should be afforded
the very same rights as another so charged by any of the other initial
documents.
Therefore, if one is charged by complaint or information and
afforded the right to challenge probable cause before a magistrate, one
charged by indictment likewise should be furnished a grand jury transcript to challenge probable cause.
Also, if one is charged by complaint or information and
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afforded a preliminary examination to be confronted by his accusers,
the right to cross-examine, and to compel the attendance of a witness
on his behalf, one charged by indictment likewise should be afforded a
preliminary examination for the same purposes.
Furthermore, if a defendant in a civil case is afforded the
right to take depositions for discovery, impeachment, confrontation,
cross-examination, and other uses, a defendant in a criminal case likewise should be afforded the same right. And, especially, if the prosecutor in a criminal case has the right to take depositions, ^ due process
and equal protection of the law surely dictate that defense counsel likewise should be afforded the very same right.
All points of this appeal are of the utmost importance in determining the jurisdiction of the lower court to proceed with the criminal
trial of the appellant and therefore should be decided by this court prior
thereto.
It is the sincere position of the appellant that this court should
reverse the lower court's order dismissing the appellant's complaint and
amended complaint and remand this matter with orders granting the
appellant verbatim copies of the grand jury transcripts, an adversary
hearing to challenge probable cause based on the testimony in such transcripts, a preliminary examination, and the right to take depositions as
48. Utah Code Ann. §§ 77-45-1 to -21 (1953).
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requested — all before any criminal trial on the indictment.
For this court to do otherwise would deprive the appellant of
his constitutional rights more specifically described in this brief.
Respectfully submitted,
PHIL L . HANSEN AND ASSOCIATES
and D. FRANK WILKINS
250 East Broadway, Suite 100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Appellant
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